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NOTE
FREEDOM:i LONG TERM RECORDING
AGREEMENTS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL MUSIC
INDUSTRY
I. INTRODUCTION
Recording agreements have the potential to bind artists to
recording companies for long periods of time. 2 Artists sign such
contracts at the beginning of their careers, when they have lit-
tle bargaining power.3 These contracts often become burden-
some to the artists. 4 It is no surprise that once an artist
becomes successful, the artist attempts to renegotiate his or her
contract.5 If the artist cannot negotiate more favorable terms,
he or she may attempt to rescind the contract.6 In the event the
record company does not allow the artist to rescind the contract,
the artist may seek judicial redress claiming the contract to be
in "restraint of trade."7
1 GEORGE MICHAEL, Freedom, on LISTEN WITHOUT PREJUDICE VOL 1
(Columbia Records 1990).
2 Chris White & Dominic Pride, Michael/Sony Verdict Resolution, BILL-
BOARD, July 2, 1994, at 1, 116-17.
3 Id.
4 Lisa Gubernick, The Olivia de Havilland of Rock , FORBES, Jan. 3, 1994, at
87.
5 Id. See also, Nicholas Wapshott, Bound to Sing Sony's Tune, THE TIMES
(London), June 22, 1994; Bad Faith , THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 1993 at 78.
6 Patrick Isherwood, Why 'Slavery' is Fair Trade, THE TIMES (London), June
28, 1994. See generally Zang Tumb Tumm Records Ltd. v. Holly Johnson, (C.A.
August, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File).
7 Isherwood, supra note 6.
One commentator has compared long term movie contracts to long term record
contracts, stating:
In the 1930's and 1940's, the motion picture industry in the U.S.
looked just like today's worldwide record industry. Major stars signed
long-term contracts, and studios spent tons of money promoting and de-
1
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The most recent English case involving an artist's attempt
to have his recording contract declared in restraint of trade in-
volves the international recording artist, songwriter and per-
former Georgios Panayiotou, professionally known as George
Michael [hereinafter Michael], who sued his record company,
Sony Music Entertainment (U.K.) [hereinafter Sony]. 8 Michael
argued that the recording agreements he signed with Sony in
1988 were unenforceable as they were in restraint of trade, 9 vio-
lative of Article 85 of the Treaty establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community,10 and, thereby, preventing competition
veloping them. Studios argued that they could not afford to promote new
stars unless they were assured the benefit of their success in later years.
Donald Passman, Commentary: Michael Trial Has No Bearing On U.S., BILL-
BOARD, Aug. 6, 1994, at 6.
"Although George Michael renegotiated his contract after his recording suc-
cess, the first contract he signed still affected the market value he could have
achieved if he was free to negotiate at the peak of his career." Dominic Pride,
Decision Does Not End Issues Debate, BILLBOARD, July 2, 1994, at 116. See Olivia
de Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 153 P.2d 983 (Calif. 1944).
Similar arguments arise today with regards to recording contract disputes.
There have been a number of cases involving English recording contracts in which
"courts have looked at the fairness and enforceability of such agreements in the
context of the manner in which they were negotiated." Isherwood, supra note 6. In
these cases, courts have found contracts to be in restraint of trade where restric-
tions are oppressive to the artist and, thus, unjustifiable. See O'Sullivan v. Man-
agement Agency and Music Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 448; Clifford Davis Management
Ltd. v. W.E.A. Records Ltd., [1975] 1 W.L.R. 61 (C.A.); and A. Schroeder Music
Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308.
8 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K.) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS Enggen Library, Cases File). Sony Music contended
Michael affirmed the 1988 agreement and that as a matter of public policy, he
could not allege that the agreement was in restraint of trade. Id. at 4. To support
this argument, Sony stated:
the 1988 agreement effectively replaced an earlier agreement made be-
tween Mr. Michael and CBS (U.K) in 1984 and that the 1984 agreement
was in turn concluded as part of the arrangements for the compromise of
proceedings between Michael and a third party in which Michael was al-
leging that a recording agreement between himself and that third party
was itself void or unenforceable as being (among other things) in restraint
of trade.
Id.
Michael denied affirming the 1988 agreement, and claimed that Sony Music
violated public policy by behaving unfairly and unconscionably. Id.
9 Id. at 3.
10 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EuRoPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, [hereinafter
EEC TREATY] art. 85.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss1/4
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within the common market." The Chancery Court ruled in
favor of Sony, holding that the 1988 agreement neither re-
strained trade nor violated article 85 of the EEC Treaty.' 2
Part II of this Note discusses restraint of trade issues in
English recording and publishing contract disputes. Part II
then discusses Article 85 issues in relation to disputes concern-
ing entertainment contracts. Part III develops the procedural
history by describing the facts involved in the Michael litiga-
tion, and it briefly summarizes the Chancery Division's holding.
This Note then analyzes the Chancery Division's holding in
Panayiotou and its impact on the international music industry.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Restraint of Trade'3
Beginning in the early fifteenth century, contracts that im-
posed an unreasonable restraint of trade were considered
11 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *181 Enggen Library, Cases File).
12 Id. After the Chancery Court decision, Michael stated that he would appeal
the ruling. Michael's appeal was set for February 1996. However, on July 13,
1995, Michael resolved his dispute with Sony in London; Michael was released
from the Sony contract. Subsequently Michael signed contracts with Virgin and
Dreamworks. According to BILLBOARD, Sony will receive between $30 million and
$40 million in exchange for releasing Michael. This sum will be paid by
Dreamworks and Virgin from the profits earned by the release of Michael's two
upcoming albums.
Unlike the contract he signed with Sony, Michael will be able to renegotiate or
sign with another record company after the release of two albums. Dreamworks
and Virgin will reportedly be paying Michael a royalty rate of 20% or higher. Vir-
gin has offered Michael concessions similar to those he was seeking from Sony.
Sony retained the rights to release a greatest-hits compilation. This compila-
tion will include tracks from the album Michael recorded for Virgin-Dreamworks,
tracks that will be licensed back to Sony. Sony currently holds the rights to FAITH
(Columbia Records 1987) and LIsTEN WITHOUT PREJUDICE VOL. 1 (Columbia
Records 1990). Besides his recording contracts with Virgin and Dreamworks,
Michael has contracted with Dick Leahy Music, "which has a worldwide sub-pub-
lishing pact with Warner/Chappell Music." See Adam White and Dominic Pride,
George Michael Arrives at Dreamworks / Virgin, Sony Suit Settled, BILLBOARD, July
22, 1995.
13 Restraint of trade occurs when a contract's terms go beyond what can be
characterized as "reasonable" in a commercial context. Such a contract is in
restraint of trade and, therefore, contrary to public policy. RIcHARD WHISH,
COMPETITION LAw 26-27 (1985).
In a free market economy, companies and individuals strive to eliminate
competition and maximize profits. One way of achieving these ends is through
3
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against public policy and, therefore, void. 14 Today, this basic
policy reasoning remains intact, as English courts still use 'rea-
sonableness' as a critical element in deciding restraint of trade
cases. 1-5 In deciding such cases, courts are interested in promot-
ing competition, and maintaining the ability of companies and
natural persons to contract.' 6 Courts must then balance these
policy considerations against "other legitimate interests, such
as the interest of a business purchaser in precluding the seller
from establishing a competing enterprise in the same locality,
or, similarly, the interest of a tradesman or professional who
trains an apprentice in a highly skilled trade."17
1. Contracts in Restraint of Trade
English courts apply a two part test in determining
whether a contract is in restraint of trade: "(1) whether the re-
strictive agreement was compatible with the public interest;
and (2) whether it was reasonable as between the parties."18
monopolies, where competitors are forced out of the market. Another way of
maximizing profits is "to reach an agreement with the other competitors to fix the
price of goods [charged by] each competitor thus maximizing the profits on its own
share of the market." Gabriele Dara, Antitrust Law in the European Community
and the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 47 LA. L. REV. 761, 761 (1987).
Courts will not enforce those agreements which go beyond "reasonableness" and,
therefore, restrain trade. Id.
14 Dara, supra note 13, at 762. See generally Dyer's Case, Y.B. II Henry 5, fol.
5, pl. 26 (1414).
15 WHISH, supra note 13, at 27. The Chancery Court stated that the court
"does not have to be satisfied that the defendant has behaved in a morally repre-
hensible way" to declare that a contract is unenforceable as a restraint of trade.
Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K) Ltd., (Chancery Division 1994)
(LEXIS *71 Enggen Library, Cases File).
16 A.H. Angelo & E.P. Ellinger, Unconscionable Contracts: A Comparative
Study of the Approaches in England, France, Germany, and the United States. 14
Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 455, 464 (1992).
17 Id. at 464. The reasonableness test is the defining issue in restraint of
trade cases and emerged in the Nordenfelt case. This test states that the contract:
must be reasonable in the interests of the contracting parties, and sec-
ondly it must be reasonable in the interests of the public. In the case of
each condition he lays down a test of reasonableness. To be reasonable in
the interests of the parties the restraint must afford adequate protection
to the party in whose favor it is imposed; to be reasonable in the interests
of the public it must be in no way injurious to the interests of the public.
Angelo & Ellingerg, supra note 16, at 464.
18 Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 16, at 464. "The second test derives from
unconscionability: whether a specific agreement is reasonable between the con-
tracting parties depends on whether it involves a restriction that is no broader
[Vol. 8:161
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Over the past eighty years, there have been a number of cases
decided by English courts involving this test and its application
to exclusive dealing agreements.
The first important English decision involving the restraint
of trade doctrine was the 1916 House of Lords case Herbert Mor-
ris Ltd. v. Saxelby.19 In Herbert Morris, a leading manufacturer
of hoisting machinery in the United Kingdom sued a company
draftsman after he left the company.20 Originally, the company
hired the defendant as an engineer after several years of ser-
vice. 21 He was hired on the condition that he would not "carry
on either as principal, agent, servant in connection with any
other person, firm or company or assist directly or indirectly in
the sale or manufacture of pulley blocks, hand overhead run-
ways, electric overhead runways or had overhead traveling
cranes"22 for a period of seven years after leaving the com-
pany.23 The House of Lords held that the covenant was in re-
straint of trade because it was more extensive than that which
was required for the protection of the company. 24 As such, the
contract was unenforceable.
Forty-nine years later, in Petrofina (Gr. Britain) Ltd. v.
Martin,25 the plaintiffs sought an injunction to restrain the de-
fendant from selling their competitor's petrol.26 The Chancery
Court denied the injunction and held that the agreement re-
stricted the use of the owner's property without any mortgage,
lease or sale, 27 and, therefore, was in restraint of trade.28 The
Chancery Court held that in order to prove that the contract
was binding, the company had to show that the restraints it im-
posed were reasonable as between the parties and not injurious
than necessary for the contracting party's protection." Angelo & Ellinger, supra
note 16, at 465. See also Herbert Morris Ltd. v. Saxelby, 1916 App. Cas. 688, 707
and Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co, 1894 App. Cas.
489, 492.
19 1916 App. Cas. 688.
20 Id. at 690.
21 Id. at 689-90.
22 Id. at 690.
23 Id.
24 Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, 1916 App. Cas. 688, 690.
25 [1965] 1 Ch. 147.
26 Id. at 148.
27 Id.
2 Id.
1996]
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to the public interest.29 The agreement in Petrofina was unrea-
sonable between the parties, and therefore, in restraint of trade.
In 1966, the House of Lords in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v.
Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd.,3o considered agreements in
which the appellants sold motor fuels to the respondents. The
House of Lords held that a contract for twenty-one years was
longer than necessary because it went beyond any period for
"which developments were reasonably foreseeable and in the
absence of evidence of some advantage to the appellants for
which a shorter period would not be adequate, the agreement
was void." 31
2. Unequal Bargaining Power
Additionally, English courts have addressed the restraint
of trade issue in the context of unequal bargaining power as
well. This is often a critical issue for a young and inexperienced
recording artist or group signing a contract with a record com-
pany for the first time. Issues of unequal bargaining power
were addressed in Binder v. Alachouzos,32 Colchester Borough
Council v. Smith,33 and Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd. v. Total Oil
(Gr. Britain) Ltd.34
In Binder, Alachouzos borrowed money from Binder. 35
Binder sued to recover the loan. 36 On the night before trial, the
parties settled.37 The settlement agreement stated that the
parties had been advised by solicitors and counsel. 38 The Court
of Appeal focused on the fact that there was a bona fide agree-
ment, and held that where both sides were advised by compe-
tent counsels, there was a fair, arguable case for each party.39
As such, the agreement was held fair and reasonable. 40
29 Id. at 147.
30 1968 App. Cas. 269.
31 Id. at 271.
32 1972 Q.B. 151.
33 1992 Ch. 421.
34 [1985] 1 W.L.R. 173.
35 Binder v. Alachouzos, 1972 Q.B. 151, 156.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 157.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 158.
40 Binder v. Alachouzos, 1972 Q.B. 151, 158.
[Vol. 8:161
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In Colchester Borough Council v. Smith, Smith asserted
that he acquired title over Colchester Borough Council's land by
adverse possession.41 The Court of Appeal held that there was
a bona fide compromise and that Smith, who was advised by
solicitors at the time of the agreement, and who subsequently
signed the agreement, was estopped from litigating the enforce-
ability of the agreement.42
In Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd. v. Total Oil (Gr. Britain) Ltd. ,43
the English Court of Appeal considered the validity of a lease
back agreement for a garage and petrol filling station.44 Alec
Lobb (Garages) Ltd. [hereinafter Garages], owned a filling sta-
tion.45 Total Oil (Gr. Britain) Ltd. [hereinafter Total Oil], ad-
vanced money to Garages, and took mortgages on Garages'
property as security.46 In 1969, Garages was in financial diffi-
culties, yet was subject to a valid four-year contract to accept
gasoline exclusively from Total Oil.4 7 Against the advice of
their solicitors, Garages entered into a transaction with Total
Oil, in which Garages granted a lease of its property to Total Oil
for fifty-one years.48 Ten years later, Garages claimed that the
transaction was void as an agreement in restraint of trade.49
The Court of Appeal stated that although the parties had une-
qual bargaining power at the time they entered into the agree-
ment because of Garages financial distress, Total Oil's conduct
in relation to the transaction was not unconscionable, coercive,
nor oppressive. Therefore, Garages' claim in equity was
invalid.50
The decisions in Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd., Binder and
Colchester Borough Council show that agreements will be valid
and enforceable in English courts, if the negotiations leading to
the execution of the agreement were fair and reasonable. The
courts decided the restraint of trade issue in each of these cases
41 Colchester Borough Council v. Smith, 1992 Ch. 421, 422.
42 Id. at 435.
43 [1985] 1 W.L.R. 173.
44 Id. at 176.
45 Id.
46Id.
47 Id. at 176.
48Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd. v. Total Oil (Gr. Britain) Ltd., [1985] 1 W.L.R.
173, 176.
49 Id. at 177.
50 Id. at 183.
19961
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by focusing on whether each party was represented adequately
and competently by counsel.
B. English Recording Contracts and Restraint of Trade
1. The English Music Trilogy5l
English courts addressed recording contracts and the re-
straint of trade issue in three cases, known as the music trilogy.
The english music trilogy consists of A. Schroeder Music Pub-
lishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay,52 Clifford Davis Management Ltd.
v. WEA Records Ltd.,53 and O'Sullivan v. Management Agency
and Music Ltd.54 In each case, the artists signed form contracts
early in their musical careers, and subsequently became
successful.55
a. Schroeder
A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay in-
volved a songwriter who signed a contract in which he assigned
the publisher a copyright in every musical work he composed
for ten years.56 The publishing company would only pay Ma-
caulay if his work was published.57 Additionally, Macaulay
could not amend the agreement or have his copyrights returned
to him if the publisher decided not to publish his songs. 58 The
court found that the publishing contract constituted an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade and was contrary to public policy 59
because Schroeder Music was not bound to use the songs Ma-
caulay composed. 60 Lord Reid stated that the publisher could
51 Michael I. Yanover and Harvey G. Kotler, Q.C., Artist/Management
Agreements and the English Music Trilogy: Another British Invasion?, 9 Loy. L.A.
ENr. L.J. 211, 214 (1989).
52 [1974] 3 All E.R. 616. See also A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co., Ltd. v.
Macaulay, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308.
53 [1975] 1 All E.R. 237 (C.A.).
54 [1984] 3 W.L.R. 448.
55 See O'Sullivan v. Management Agency and Music Ltd., [1985] 3 All E.R.
351 (C.A.); Clifford Davis Management Ltd., [1975] 1 All E.R. 237 (C.A.); A.
Schroeder Music Publishing Co., Ltd. v. Macaulay, Ltd., [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308.
56 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co., Ltd. v. Macaulay, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308,
1314H.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1315A.
59 Id. at 1315A.
60 Id. at 1313C-D.
[Vol. 8:161
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have just "put [the artist's songs] in a drawer and leave them
there."61 The House of Lords held that this contract was
neither freely made, nor bargained for on equal terms. Further,
it recognized that "established composers who can bargain on
equal terms can and do make their own contracts."62 Lord
Diplock also noted that bargaining power depends on whether
an artist is successful because music publishers who negotiate
with successful artists do not insist in negotiating under the
standard contract originally offered to the artist.6 3 In the case
of Schroeder, the House of Lords found the contract at issue to
be in restraint of trade, and thus, void.
64
b. Davis
One week after the House of Lords handed down the
Schroeder decision, the English Court of Appeal 65 decided Clif-
ford Davis Management Ltd. v. WEA Records Ltd.66 Davis in-
volved the publishing agreements of the English pop group
Fleetwood Mac.67 The issue before the court was whether the
publishing agreements signed by Fleetwood Mac were funda-
61 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co., Ltd. v. Macaulay, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308,
1313D.
62 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co., Ltd. v. Macaulay, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308,
1314G (citing Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd., 1968
App. Cas. 269). In Esso, the House of Lords ruled that "a tie of 21 years went
beyond any period for which developments were reasonably foreseeable and in the
absence of evidence of some advantage to the appellants for which a shorter period
of time would not be adequate, the agreement was void." Esso, 1968 App. Cas. 269.
The Schroeder court noted that:
[any contract by which a person engages to give his exclusive services to
another for a period necessarily involves extensive restrictions during
that period of the common law right to exercise any lawful activity he
chooses in such a manner as he thinks best .... But if contractual restric-
tions appear to be unnecessary or to be reasonably capable of enforcement
in an oppressive manner, then they must be justified before they can be
enforced.
[19741 1 W.L.R. at 1314G-H.
63 Schroeder, [1974] 1 W.L.R. at 1316F-G.
64 Id. at 1317A. Although the unequal bargaining power between the parties
in this case did not raise a presumption of unconscionability, English courts, when
confronted with such a situation, are vigilant to make sure that the contract was
not unconscionable. Id. at 1316G-H.
65 The House of Lords hears appeals from the English Court of Appeal.
66 [1975] 1 All E.R. 237 (C.A.).
67 Id. at 238.
9
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mentally unfair to the group. 68 Under the publishing agree-
ments, if the group's songs were published, the group would
receive ten percent of the retail price of the sheet music and
fifty percent of the royalties from the sale of records. 69 The
court held that the publishing agreements gave the publisher or
manager "a stranglehold over each of the composers." 70 In
describing the similarities between the Davis agreement and
the Schroeder agreement, the court found the Davis agreement
fundamentally unfair. 71 Under the Davis agreement, each com-
poser had an obligation to the publisher for ten years without
any promise from the publisher other than to use best efforts.
72
The court held that the ten year contract was unfair, just as the
twenty-one year agreement for a garage in Esso Petroleum Co.
Ltd. v. Harpers Garage (Stourport) Ltd. 73 The court focused on
the fact that the group neither consulted a lawyer, nor had legal
advisors.74 The court reasoned that there was inequality of bar-
gaining power, and held that neither the agreement, nor the as-
signment of copyright was enforceable. 75
68 Id.
69 Id. at 239.
70 Id.
The court held that:
In every work which the composer produces over a period of ten years, the
copyright is vested in the publisher. The publisher had the right for six
months to reject any work without payment. If he did not reject it, he was
held to have retained it. But even when he retained it, he was not under
any positive obligation to exploit it ....
Id.
71 Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. WEA Records Ltd., [1975) 1 All E.R.
237, 239-40 (C.A.).
72 Id. at 240.
73 1968 App. Cas. 269. In Esso Petroleum, the House of Lords asked whether
two exclusive purchasing agreements were enforceable. The initial problem was to
decide whether the agreements were subject to the restraint of trade doctrine at
all. Id. at 271.
The Lordships all agreed that they were, but provided three different ex-
planations of why this was so. The explanation given by the majority in-
volves the 'opening the door' test. This test states that if a contract fetters
an existing freedom whereby the respondent had agreed to acquire petrol
from the appellant, it can be said to restraint trade. If however it simply
opens a door providing the covenantor with a new economic opportunity,
it can not.
RicHARD WHISH, COMPETrIION LAw, 29 (1985).
74 Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. WEA Records Ltd., [1975] 1 All E.R.
237, 241 (C.A.).
75 Id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss1/4
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c. O'Sullivan
O'Sullivan v. Management Agency and Music Ltd., was de-
cided by the English Court of Appeal in 1984.76 Raymond
O'Sullivan, a composer, signed management contracts with
Gordon Mills, an internationally known manager, who was also
a shareholder in a management agency publishing company
and record company.77 O'Sullivan was inexperienced in busi-
ness matters and relied on Mill's advice when he entered into
the agreements. 78 Mills never informed O'Sullivan to obtain in-
dependent legal advice. 79 The court noted that there was ine-
quality of bargaining power between the parties.8 0 The court
held that Mills and his companies had a fiduciary duty to
O'Sullivan and, therefore, all of the agreements signed by
O'Sullivan were obtained by undue influence. 8 '
2. Post-Trilogy Cases
a. Elton Hercules John
Two years after O'Sullivan, the Chancery Court decided is-
sues similar to those addressed in the trilogy cases.8 2 Elton
John and Bernie Taupin were minors when they signed an
agreement with Dick James Music [hereinafter DJM].83 After
Elton John became a popular recording artist, Mr. James
sought to renegotiate all of the existing contracts and told John
that he wanted him to be represented by legal counsel in future
music dealings.84 Because of this renegotiation, John and
76 [1985] 1 Q.B. 428 (C.A.).
77 Id. at 444. Clause 6 of the management agreement gave Mills complete
"discretion to appoint any agent for the purpose of obtaining engagements or fur-
thering O'Sullivan's career...." Id. at 448.
78 Id. The lower court held that Mills did not advise O'Sullivan to seek in-
dependent legal counsel out of fear that he would not be able to maintain the com-
panies' strong hold over O'Sullivan. As a result, the agreements were deemed void
and unenforceable as restraints of trade based on the Schroeder ruling. Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 449.
81 [1985] 1 Q.B. 428, 449 (C.A.).
82 Elton Hercules John v. Richard Leon James, High Court of Justice, Chan-
cery Division, 1982 J. No. 15026 (Nov. 29, 1985).
83 Yanover and Kotler, supra note 51, at 226.
84 Elton Hercules John v. Richard Leon James, High Court of Justice, Chan-
cery Division, 1982 J. No. 15026, 2 (Nov. 29, 1985).
1996]
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Taupin sued DJM on the basis of undue influence,8 5 claiming
that the publishing agreements should be set aside.8 6 The
Chancery Court held that the Mr. James and DJM were fiducia-
ries.87 Thus, the court allowed DJM to retain a percentage of
the profits, without ordering the return of copyrights nor the
delivery of master recordings.88
b. Holly Johnson
The most recent English music dispute case dealing with
restraint of trade prior to Panayiotou, involved the recording
group Frankie Goes to Hollywood. In 1989, the English Court of
Appeal in Zang Tumb Tumm Records Ltd. v. Holly Johnson
8 9
held that the recording and publishing agreement between the
group Frankie Goes to Hollywood and their record company was
in restraint of trade. 90 The court described the recording artists
at the time of contracting as "young men in fairly humble cir-
cumstances and of little business experience." 91 The court
noted that the pop group was now represented by a solicitor in
negotiations with the record company. 92 Holly Johnson argued
that the terms of the recording and publishing agreements,
even after concessions were made during the negotiations, were
so unfair that they could not be enforced. 93
The court agreed with Johnson and concluded that the re-
cording agreement was unenforceable because it was an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade. 94 Under the terms of the contract, a
member of the band could only form a new group if the record-
ing company approved of his new partners who agreed to be
bound by all the outstanding terms of the recording agree-
85 Yanover and Kotler, supra note 51, at 228. "Initially, John and Taupin
claimed that the agreements were an unreasonable restraint of trade, but later
abandoned that claim." Yanover and Kotler, supra note 51, at 228.
86 Yanover and Kotler, supra note 51 at 228.
87 Elton Hercules John v. Richard Leon James, High Court of Justice, Chan-
cery Division, 1982 J. No. 15026, 61 (Nov. 29, 1985).
88 Id. at 64-76.
89 Zang Tumb Tumm Records Ltd. v. Holly Johnson, (C.A. August, 1989)
(LEXIS *15, Enggen Library, Cases File).
90 Id. at 14-15.
91 Id. at 3.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 3.
94 Zang Tumb Tumm Records Ltd. v. Holly Johnson, (C.A. August, 1989)
(LEXIS *9, Enggen Library, Cases File).
[Vol. 8:161
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ment.95 Another provision stated that if the members of the
group wanted another lead singer, they would have to find one
the recording company found acceptable. 96 In addition, the new
singer would be bound by all the outstanding terms of the re-
cording agreement. 97 The recording agreement's terms regard-
ing duration were found to be unfair and one-sided since the
members of the group were bound collectively and individu-
ally.98 Therefore, the English Court of Appeal ruled in favor of
the pop group Frankie Goes to Hollywood, holding that the re-
cording agreement violated restraint of trade principles.99
C. Article 85 Claims and Exclusive Artist Agreements
European Community competition law "must be under-
stood within the context of Community principles that attempt
to break down the national boundaries between member states
of the European Community and to complete the unification of
the common market."10 0 Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, 10 1
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. "Though the members of the group are exclusively bound to the record-
ing company the recording company is not exclusively bound to them." Id. The
court stated:
[plop musicians are promoted by the sales of their records, and obviously a
recording company has difficulty in promoting a little known group when
there are so many others seeking fame and fortune. Stringent provisions
such as many of those in the recording agreement may be justifiable in an
agreement of short duration. But the onus must, in my judgment, be on
the recording company to justify its length of the Term and the one-sided-
ness of the provisions as to duration in this recording agreement.
Id. at 9-10.
98 Zang Tumb Tumm Records Ltd. v. Holly Johnson, (C.A. August, 1989)
(LEXIS *9, Enggen Library, Cases File). The recording company had discretion,
for up to seven option periods after the seven month initial period, to exercise it's
options under Clause 3. Id.
The court described the contract as follows:
Each option period is to be for at least one year and possibly for up to 120
days or a third of a year or more. It is an agreement which could well last
eight or nine years and during all that time, when their earning potential
would be likely to be at its highest, the members of the group would be
bound to record only for the recording company. But the recording com-
pany itself is free to terminate its obligations at any time by not exercising
the next option.
Id.
99 Id. at 10.
100 Spencer Weber Waller, Understanding and Appreciating EC Competition
Law, 61 ANTITRUST L. J. 55 (1992). The European Community "was created in
13
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which embodies the above policy, was the first set of European
rules designed to prevent and address anti-competitive behav-
ior. 10 2 To invoke article 85, the agreement must be "between
undertakings, decision by associations of undertakings and con-
certed practices which may affect trade between Member States
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restric-
tion or distortion of competition within the common market."10 3
1957 in order to establish a new European common market and to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising
of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it."
Id. at 56.
101 EEC TaREATY art. 85.
102 Dara, supra note 13, at 762-63.
EEC TREATY article 85 reads:
Article 85
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations
of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member states and which have as their object of effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in
particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trad-
ing conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or accord-
ing to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in
the case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not in-
dispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition
in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
EEC TREATY art. 85.
103 See EEC TREATY art. 85.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss1/4
LONG TERM RECORDING AGREEMENTS
An 'undertaking,' 10 4 for treaty application, may be a company or
an individual, and, thus, applicable to recording artists, pro-
vided the natural person, otherwise out of reach of article 85,
'engages in economic activities."0 5
Article 85 applies to contracts "which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition." 10 6
As a result, only "agreements which may affect trade between
Member States are subject to the prohibitions of article 85."107
This limitation applies regardless of the degree of impact an
agreement, such as a recording contract, may have on competi-
tion.10 8 The requirement that an agreement have an effect on
trade between Member States is "the boundary between the ar-
eas respectively covered by Community law and the law of the
member-states."' 0 9
Nevertheless, agreements can easily be found to violate
this provision because courts and the European Commission
construe this requirement broadly. 110 Courts consider this re-
quirement met when a particular agreement "may have an in-
fluence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of
trade between the Member States."'1 1 As such, article 85 at-
tempts to address the "prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the Common Market. .".."112 "[fln judging
whether an agreement potentially may have an impact on the
trade between Member States or may distort competition, its
weight must be evaluated with respect to 'the economic and
legal context in which such agreements ... are to be found.'"113
Section two of article 85 states that all agreements made in
violation of section one are void, "while section three provides
104 See Dara, supra note 13, at 765.
105 See Dara, supra note 13, at 765. See generally Reuter v. BASF A.G., [1976]
2 C.M.L.R. 44D.
106 EEC TREATY art. 85. See also Dara, supra note 13, at 767.
107 EEC TREATY art. 85.
108 See Dara, supra note 13, at 767.
109 Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 345, 373.
110 Dara, supra note 13, at 767.
111 Dara, supra note 13, at 767. See La Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau
Ulm, [1966] C.M.L.R. 357, 375.
112 EEC TRATY art. 85.
113 Dara, supra note 13, at 769 (quoting Brasserie de Haecht v. Vilkins, [1968]
C.M.L.R. 26, 40).
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the possibility of an exemption from those sanctions."114 In or-
der to obtain the exemption, the agreement must satisfy four
conditions:
(a) contribution to the improvement of the production or distribu-
tion of goods or to the promotion of technical or economic progress;
(b) allocation to consumers of a fair share of the benefit; (c) avoid-
ance of unnecessary restrictions; and (d) less than complete elimi-
nation of competition 'in respect of a substantial part of the
products in question."' 15
In ICI v. Commission,116 the European Court of Justice
[hereinafter ECJ], attempted for the first time to define a con-
certed practice. 117 In this case, the ECJ found the presence of a
concerted practice due to a "concordance of the rate and timing
of the price increase made by the challenged companies and the
existence of previous informal contacts between them."" 8 Addi-
tionally, the ECJ described the differences between a concerted
practice and an agreement." 9 The ECJ held that a concerted
practice is a "form of co-ordination between undertakings
which, without going so far as to amount to an agreement prop-
erly so called, knowingly substitutes a practical co-operation be-
tween them for the risks of competition." 20
D. Application of Article 85 to the Music Industry
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome sets the framework for sit-
uations in which the recording industry can easily become sus-
ceptible to claims regarding article 85 violations. Artists who
meet the jurisdictional limitations imposed by the European
Community, can seek protection from the anti-competition
practices of their record companies in article 85.
The record music market:
is characterized by certain special features, including the hetero-
geneous nature and short life cycle of its products, the constant
change in consumer preferences, based to some extent on changes
114 EEC TREATY art. 85, §§ 1-3.
115 Dara, supra note 13, at 771.
116 1972 E.C.R. 619, [1972] 2 C.M.L.R. 557.
117 Id. at 622. See also Dara, supra note 13, at 766.
118 Dara, supra note 13, at 766.
119 ICI v. Commission, 1972 E.C.R. 619, 622.
120 Id. at 622.
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in fashion, and the significance of individual articles or hit records
to a record companies' profitability rather than the development
of brand loyalty to individual record labels on the part of the ulti-
mate consumer.
121
As a result of the volatile nature of the recording industry,
only the major recording companies can compete for major art-
ists, some of whom can demand high advances, as in the case of
Michael. 122 Although many record companies compete within
the European market, "none have become significant market
forces."' 2 3 Based upon the recording industry's unpredictable
and extreme concentration, it is not surprising that record com-
panies in the European Community are often the subject of
competition based litigation with regard to exclusive artist
agreements.
This litigation involves the issue of whether the record com-
pany has effectively removed the artist from the market in
which his or her services are being sought. Record companies
often sign artists to lengthy contracts to keep the artist, once he
or she becomes successful, from signing with a competing com-
pany. As such, the European Commission found that the struc-
tural features of the market(s) for recorded music may involve
situations of collective dominance. 124
121 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *190 Enggen Library, Cases File).
122 Id.
123 Id. For example, while there have been no entrants on the UK market in
the last five years, their combined market share amounts to only 4% of the market
for albums. Id.
124 Id. The "Decision on the Merger Task Force" analyzed the market and com-
petition between record companies in the European Community. The Commission
concluded that the proposed acquisition would not create or strengthen a dominant
position among the five major record companies as a result of which competition
would be significantly impeded in the common market or a substantial part of it.
The music recording industry is highly concentrated. The pop music market has
been particularly concentrated since the latter half of the 1980's. Since 1988 at
least six independent labels have been acquired by the top five major companies.
Virgin is in fact the last remaining significant independent record company. Id.
The combined market share of the leading five companies - Thorn EMI, Sony,
Polygram, Warner, and Bertelsmann (BMG) is currently estimated at 77% for the
EEC as a whole and ranges from around 70% to 80% in individual member states.
Each of Thorn EMI's major competitors are significant participants in the market.
They are all active in most types of music and in every Member State. As a result
of the disappearance of Virgin from the market, the level of concentration will in-
crease. Thus, the top five companies will themselves control an estimated 83% of
1996] 177
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Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome is, therefore, applicable to
companies and artists involved in the music industry.125 In
the EEC market. In individual member states the level of concentration will range
from around 70% to 95%. Id.
125 Frank L. Fine, The Impact of EEC Competition Law in the Music Industry,
12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 508 (1992).
Article 85 also applies to companies based outside the EEC: Companies based
outside the EEC may be subject to Community jurisdiction in one of two ways. If
the company has a subsidiary or other presence in the Common Market, the Com-
mission may assert the 'single economic entity' theory by which the anti-competi-
tive behavior of the EEC-based subsidiary or office is attributed to the third-
country parent. Alternatively, jurisdiction may be imposed on a headquarter[s]
outside the EEC where the anti-competitive agreement is implemented within the
EEC. This latter assertion ofjurisdiction does not require the company in question
to have a legal presence in the EEC. Id. at 508.
Article 85(1) prohibits agreements and concerted practices which
have the 'object or effect' of restricting competition within the Common
Market, subject to the possibility of an exemption (individual or block) on
public policy grounds pursuant to Article 85(3). In order to qualify for an
exemption under Article 85(3), an agreement must satisfy two 'positive'
and two 'negative' criteria. The 'positive' criteria are that the agreement
must either contribute to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress. The 'negative' crite-
ria are that the agreement must not impose restrictions which are not
'indispensable' nor which may eliminate competition with respect to a
'substantial part' of the products or services in question. Id. at 509.
Article 85(1) applies to agreements which have as their 'object or ef-
fect' the restriction of competition. It is generally very difficult for the
Commission to prove that the 'object' of the agreement is to restrict com-
petition. A number of agreements are, however, by their very nature re-
strictive of competition, and in such cases the Commission does not
hesitate to find that infingements per se have been committed. Exam-
ples of such cases include price fixing and export bans. Id. at 510.
Regardless of whether 'object' or 'effect' is relied upon by the commis-
sion, it is clear that Article 85(1) cannot be infringed where the agreement
in question is incapable of having an 'appreciable' or substantial effect on
competition. In the notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, published
in 1986, the Commission established a de minimus rule which is applica-
ble to Article 85(1). According to this notice, agreements do not normally
fall within the prohibition of Article 85(1) where: i) The goods or services
do not represent more than 5% of the total market for such goods or serv-
ices in the area of the Common Market affected by the agreement ii) The
aggregate annual turnover of the participating undertakings does not in
the aggregate exceed 200 million ECU ($250 million); and iii) Such mar-
ket share or turnover is not exceeded by more than one-tenth during two
successive financial years.
Id. at 509-11.
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particular, exclusive artist agreements are subject to the re-
strictions of article 85.126
In Re Unitel Film- Und Fernseh-Produktionsgesellschaft
mbH & Co., 1 2 7 the European Commission held that exclusive
artist agreements are subject to article 85.128 In Re Unitel, four
of La Scala's leading singers had exclusive contracts with
Unitel, which prevented them from further commercializing
their artistic performances in any of the EEC Member
States.1 29  Radio Televisione Italiana [hereinafter RAI],
planned to broadcast the live La Scala performance of Don Car-
los to a worldwide audience.' 30 When RAI received Unitel's ob-
jections to this broadcast, it complained to the commission.' 3 '
The Commission held that artist contracts like those between
the La Scala singers and Unitel were subject to article 85.132
The Commission ruled that artists are undertakings within the
meaning of article 85(1) when they commercially exploit their
artistic performances.' 33 In addition, the Commission sug-
gested that a non-competition clause may infringe upon article
85(1) if it has appreciable effects on competition.' 34
In 1981, the European Commission began negotiations
with record company executives to develop a model recording
agreement which did not violate article 85.135 The record com-
panies wanted to develop a recording contract that would not
risk the commercial value of their recording agreements.' 36
These negotiations, however, failed to produce the model agree-
ments sought by the record companies.' 37
126 Id. at 511. In addition, Article 85 covers, "copyright licenses, mechanical
rights agreements, exclusive distribution agreements, market division agree-
ments; and joint venture agreements." Id.
127 [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 306.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 307.
130 Id. at 306.
131 Id.
132 Re Unitel Film- Und Fernseh-Produktionsgesellschaft mbH & Co., [1978] 3
C.M.L.R. 306, 308.
133 Id. at 307.
134 Id.
135 Fine, supra note 125, at 512.
136 Fine, supra note 125, at 512.
137 Fine, supra note 125, at 512.
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III: PANAYIOTOU v. SoNy Music ENTERTAINMENT (UK)
LTD. 1
3 8
In 1982, Michael's band, Wham!, signed a recording con-
tract with Inner Vision Records.' 3 9 Afterwards, doubting Inner
Vision's professionalism and promotional skills, 140 Michael re-
scinded the Inner Vision Agreement, and signed with a "ma-
jor,"' 41 CBS (UK).' 42 In 1984, he contracted with CBS to
produce eight albums.' 43 In December of 1986, Michael ap-
proached CBS (UK) to renegotiate the 1984 agreement to obtain
financial returns equivalent of other world-famous pop musi-
138 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K.) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS Enggen Library, Cases File).
139 Id. at 10. At the time, Inner Vision Records had a licensing agreement with
Sony Music (then CBS (UK)). Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 11. "Major" refers to the leading five companies in the music indus-
try. These companies are Thorn EMI, Sony, Polygram, Warner and Bertelsmann
(BMG). Id. at 189. In a 1983 letter, Michael's attorney stated that the Inner Vi-
sion agreement was void on grounds of restraint of trade. Id. at 11.
142 Id. at 11. By rescinding this agreement, Michael was attempting to negoti-
ate the release of his band from the Inner Vision Agreement which would enable
the band to contract directly with CBS (UK). Id. Following a hearing regarding
this dispute, Inner Vision, Michael and Ridgeley negotiated a deal in which Wham!
signed directly with CBS(UK). The Chancery Court stated that Inner Vision's
claims were effectively "bought off" by CBS(UK), resulting in the settlement of the
Inner Vision action. Id. at 13.
143 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *13 Enggen Library, Cases File). The 1984 agreement pro-
vided for the delivery of master recordings for the first album during an initial
contract period limited to last a maximum of three years, with options to CBS (UK)
to extend the contract for up to a further seven contract periods, with master re-
cordings for a further album to be delivered during each of those periods. Id.
Michael was satisfied with the 1984 agreement, although, he believed Wham!
could have negotiated better contract terms on the open market. Id. at 14. (The
1984 agreement was in fact renegotiated: a renegotiation which resulted in the
1988 agreement, the agreement challenged in this action). Id.
Michael's attorney, Tony Russell, during cross-examination stated that he be-
lieved that the 1984 agreement was a binding agreement, and that the "question of
the 1984 agreement being in restraint of trade (a doctrine with which he was fully
familiar and which was very fresh in his mind, having acted for Wham! in the
Inner Vision Action) did not cross his mind." Id.
The singles, Wake Me Up Before You Go and Careless Whisper were released
and are successful. Id. "In January 1985, CBS(UK) exercised the first of its seven
options under the 1984 agreement, thus committing Wham! to deliver a second
album." Id. at 15. From 1984 to 1986 Wham! released successful singles. Id. at
14-15.
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cians."44 In 1987, CBS released FAITH, which was a commercial
success and one which made Michael a popular international
solo artist.145 Michael's efforts to renegotiate the 1984 agree-
ment resulted in the 1988 agreement, 146 which terms Michael
agreed to accept. 147 In September of 1990, Sony released Lis-
TEN WITHOUT PREJUDICE - VOL I which was less successful in
terms of sales than FAITH. 148 Michael alleged that the Sony
Group failed to market the album properly. 49 In November of
1991, Michael unsuccessfully attempted to renegotiate the 1988
agreement.' 50 In 1992 Michael sued Sony, alleging that the
1988 agreement was unenforceable as an unreasonable re-
144 Id. at 16.
145 Id. at 21. Sales of Faith were four million by the end of 1987. By the end of
1992, more than fourteen million copies of Faith had been sold worldwide. Id.
146 Id. at 26. Michael stated, "I felt that I had little alternative but to accept
CBS' offer, as I needed CBS' maximum support for my new album [i.e. Faith] and I
feared that I might antagonize Mr. Yetnikoff and put that support at risk if I made
any further demands." Id. Michael further stated that the dealings with CBS had
"run smoothly" and that CBS had not tried to interfere artistically. In early Janu-
ary 1988, Sony bought CBS, and CBS (UK) thereupon became Sony Music. During
cross-examination, Michael, recalled that after the renegotiation, he was commit-
ted to perform his contractual obligations with CBS. Id.
147 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *26 Enggen Library, Cases File). "Mr. Michael was looking
to Sony to treat him as he deserved - that is, in line with Sony's top U.S. artists ...
in those circumstances, he was happy for his advisors to attempt a simple renegoti-
ation of the commercial terms of the 1988 agreement." Id.
148 Id. at 38.
149 Id. at 37. Michael stated that Sony's failure "[riesulted from a deliberate
policy decision to reduce it's efforts on that album because Mr. Michael had de-
clined to appear in videos for the promotion of that album." Id. In August of 1990,
the single Praying for Time was released in the U.S. Sony wanted to release an-
other single from LISTEN WrrHOUT PREJUDICE VOL I, entitled Freedom, as the "first
single on the basis that it was more representative of Michael's previous style, but
had on this occasion deferred to Mr. Michael's wishes." Id.
150 Id. at 42. Michael's attorneys attempted a further renegotiation of the 1988
agreement limited to the royalty rate for compact discs. Sony proposed that
Michael appear in three promotional videos. Michael considered this " 'an unrea-
sonable demand,' notwithstanding that it was not in fact a demand at all but a
proposal put forward in response to a request by Mr. Michael that his financial
terms be improved still further." Id. Sony Music alleged that since Michael re-
quested payment of the advance for the third album, Michael affirmed the 1988
agreement. Id. at 44. In a fax, Michael stated that there had been a deterioration
in Sony's attitude over a number of years. He concluded by stating: "I came into
this business to make music, not software." Id. at 48.
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straint of trade, and void as being in contravention of article 85
of the European Economic Treaty. 15 1
A. Restraint of Trade
In addressing the restraint of trade issue, the Chancery
Court first determined whether the 1988 agreement "attracted"
the doctrine. 152 Sony argued that the agreement did not "at-
tract" the doctrine, because the agreement was in accord with
standard recording agreements used in the business and was
not unconscionable. 153 Sony also argued that the enforcement
of its terms would not cause hardship to Michael, nor prevent
his creative output from being released to the public. 154 Addi-
tionally, Sony claimed that it was not open to Michael, as a mat-
151 Id. at 48. In his opening statement, Mr. Cran, Michael's counsel, described
this action in the following terms:
This case in not about money; it is not about the wish of somebody to
benefit from being freed from a contract which he has freely entered into.
It is about restraint of trade. It is about an agreement which binds George
Michael for the whole of his professional career on terms which are capa-
ble of being worked to his substantial disadvantage.
Id. at 49.
During his cross-examination, Michael explained his reasons for commencing
this action:
Q: . .. would you agree with me that the motives on your side for this
litigation, the motives which are driving you in this litigation, have very
little to do with the legal reasons which appear in the pleadings?
A: Yes.
Q: And that your reasons for this litigation is simply that you do not get
on with Sony any more?
A: ... My reason for wanting to part with Sony is because I don't believe
that one particular area of the world which is very important to me tie.
the U.S.] has any belief in me or any motivation to exploit my work.
Id. at 49.
As the court stressed:
Mr. Michael's motive in challenging the 1988 Agreement (as varied) under
the restraint of trade doctrine, and under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, is
to rid himself of a contract which-despite renegotiations in 1988 and 1990
- he now regards as being no longer in his interest. Although certain
breaches of the 1988 Agreement are alleged, those allegations are made in
the context of the restraint of trade issue. As Mr. Cran made clear at the
start of the hearing the main thrust of this action is not about breaches of
the agreement by Sony.'
Id. at 50.
152 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K.) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *92 Enggen Library, Cases File).
153 Id. at 93.154 Id.
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ter of public policy, to plead that the 1988 agreement was in
restraint of trade because the 1984 agreement was entered into
as the result of a compromise from the Inner Vision Action.15
The court agreed with Sony and held that the 1988 agree-
ment should not be treated as a new agreement because it was a
renegotiation of a pre-existing agreement. 156 Additionally, the
court held that the agreement did not violate public policy. 157
The court then stated that the conclusion it reached on the pub-
lic policy argument made it unnecessary to consider the re-
straint of trade issue. 158 Nevertheless, the court examined the
remaining questions dealing with the restraint of trade issue
under the test from Nordenfelt159 in the event that the 1988
agreement did attract the doctrine of restraint of trade. 160 Sony
identified twelve "legitimate interests" for the purposes of the
Nordenfelt test.161
155 Id. It was in this action that Mr. Michael alleged that his then existing
agreement (the Inner Vision agreement) was in restraint of trade. Id.
156 Id. at 94.
157 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *96 Enggen Library, Cases File).
158 Id. at 100.
159 Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co., 1894 App. Cas.
565. For a discussion of Nordenfelt, see Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 16, at 464.
For a discussion of the Nordenfelt test, see infra note 177.
160 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K.) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *101 Enggen Library, Cases File). Michael argued that the
1988 agreement's restrictive nature should "outrage the Court." Id. at 120. The
court held that it "is impossible to be outraged at the prospect of Mr. Michael being
denied the opportunity, once he has achieved success under the provisions of his
existing recording agreement, to capitalize on that success in the open market by
commanding even greater financial returns than he has so far enjoyed." Id.
161 Id. at 114.
Sony's twelve legitimate interests for the purpose of the Nordenfelt test were:
i) The desire to sell as many records as possible. ii) The desire to
ensure that there is an even and adequate flow of product. iii) The desire
to be able to plan ahead. iv) The desire to have available proven success-
ful product for as long as possible. v) The desire and need to be able to
compete on equal terms in an international environment against other
record companies which have long term signing. vi) The desire to be
known for continued high calibre releases by long term successful artists
in order to maintain a reputation with consumers, dealers and new un-
signed artists. vii) The desire to maintain morale and enthusiasm
amongst employees. viii) The desire and need to recover the investment
made in a particular artist. ix) The desire to make a profit on that invest-
ment. x) The need to have available sufficient product to finance (a) losses
on unsuccessful product, and (b) the fixed costs of the infrastructure (in-
cluding overheads). xi) The desire to accumulate property rights as an
1996]
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In attempting to legitimize their business practices, Sony
argued that long-term contracts are justified because when an
artist is successful, the profits of the artist's success should be
available to cover the cost of artists who are not as success-
ful.16 2 The court concluded that the terms of the 1988 agree-
ment were justified. 163 The Chancery Court held that the
restrictions in the 1988 agreement were reasonably necessary
for the protection of the legitimate interest of Sony and com-
mensurate with the benefits Michael received.164 In supporting
this conclusion, the court noted that the 1988 agreement was a
renegotiation of an earlier agreement. 165
The court noted that by January of 1988, Michael was an
established artist who had achieved commercial success as a
solo artist with his album "Faith," and that Michael's aim in
renegotiation was to achieve parity with other superstars. 166
Additionally, the court stated that the essence of the renegoti-
ation, as defined in the 1988 agreement, was a substantial im-
provement in Michael's financial terms in exchange for
additional albums. 167 As such, the 1988 agreement was reason-
able in meeting the requirements of the Nordenfelt test and,
therefore, was not in restraint of trade.
B. The Article 85 Issue
First, the Chancery Court held that Michael's service com-
panies and Sony were "undertakings" for purposes of article
85(1).168 As applied to the 1988 agreement, the court held that
the issue, relating to the effect of trade for article 85 purposes,
was whether this agreement had any actual or potential reper-
asset. xii) The desire to have a supply of successful product in the future
at reasonable and predictable prices.
Id.
162 Id. at 120.
163 Id. at 135.
164 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K.) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *135 Enggen Library, Cases File) (quoting Schroeder,
[19741 1 W.L.R. 1308, 1315H).
165 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K.) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *136 Enggen Library, Cases File).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 167.
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cussions on competition in the market for pop records. 169
Michael argued that the 1988 agreement had an adverse effect
on the "raw material" market because it prevented him from
producing recordings for other record companies in other Mem-
ber States.170 Additionally, he argued that it had an effect on
the "end product" market because it affected the flow of trade
for his recordings. Because of these reasons, Michael concluded
that the 1988 agreement had an effect on trade between Mem-
ber States. 171
However, the Chancery Court viewed the market for the
services of U.K. recording artists in the pop field as a purely
domestic one, only limited to the U.K. 172 As a result, the court
held there was no Community-wide market for the services of
U.K. recording artists in the field of popular music for the pur-
poses of article 85(1). 1 73 Therefore, the 1988 agreement did not
affect trade between Member States. Hence, the article 85 pre-
liminary jurisdictional requirement for article 85 purposes was
not fulfilled in this case. 174
IV. ANALYsis
The litigation between Michael and Sony, analogous to the
litigation in Schroeder, O'Sullivan, Davis, Elton John and Holly
Johnson, will have an affect on the way contracts are negotiated
and drafted in the European Community and the World.
169 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K.) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *170 Enggen Library, Cases File).
170 Id.
171 Id. Michael then argued that the effect on trade between Member States
was not de minimus given:
(a) the size and status of Sony Music and the Sony Group, (b) the fact that
Mr. Michael is (and was in January 1988) a highly successful recording
artist, whose records have achieved substantial sales, and (c) the fact that
the 1988 agreement forms part of a 'network of similar agreements' (i.e.
agreements between other recording artists and other 'majors.'
Id.
The court noted that there was "no evidence that U.K. artists sign with foreign
record companies." Id. at 171. The only exceptions the court noted were the Roll-
ing Stones and Rob Halford with Sony U.S. and the Stone Roses with Geffen
Records. Id.
172 Id. at 171. The market the court viewed as domestic was the market in
which Michael engaged his services. Id.
173 Id.
174 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K.) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *175 Enggen Library, Cases File).
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A. The 1988 Agreement in the Context of a Renegotiation
The Chancery Court correctly held that the 1988 agree-
ment Michael signed was a renegotiation of a pre-existing 1984
agreement. Since Michael did not contest the enforceability of
the 1984 agreement, and negotiated the 1988 agreement based
on the 1984 agreement, receiving a financial improvement in
the terms of his contract, the contract was properly held to be
enforceable. However, the Chancery Court noted that a renego-
tiation needed to be justified under the doctrine of restraint of
trade, 175 yet it still could result in terms which are oppressive to
the artist involved.176
B. The 1988 Agreement under the Nordenfelt test.
The court correctly analyzed the restraint of trade claim
brought against Sony under the test formulated in Nordenfelt v.
Maxim Guns and Ammunition Co. 177 The concept of "inequality
of bargaining power" must be placed in a commercial context. 1
78
As held in Alec Lobb Ltd. v. Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd., the
"mere existence of an inequality of bargaining power"179 does
not amount to unconscionability. °8 0 The 1984 agreement
Michael signed was binding, hence, while renegotiating the
terms of the recording agreement, "he was in the position of any
other recording artist renegotiating the terms of his or her re-
cording agreement; he was negotiating against the background
of an existing binding contract."18 ' As such, there is always an
175 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K.) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *95 Enggen Library, Cases File) (citing Esso Petroleum Co.
Ltd. v. Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd., 1968 App. Cas. 269).
176 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *95 Enggen Library, Cases File).
177 1894 App. Cas. 489. The Nordenfelt test states that the contract:
Must be reasonable in the interests of the contracting parties, and
secondly it must be reasonable in the interests of the public. In the case of
each condition he lays down a test of reasonableness. To be reasonable in
the interests of the parties the restraint must afford adequate protection
to the party in whose favor it is imposed; to be reasonable in the interests
of the public it must be in no way injurious to the interests of the public.
Id. at 535.
176 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *105 Enggen Library, Cases File).
179 Id.
150 Id.
181 Id. at 106.
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inequality of bargaining positions in situations of renegotiation
between a record company and an artist.
Additionally, the Chancery Court correctly distinguished
Schroeder from the Michael case. Unlike Michael, the song-
writer in Schroeder entered into a form agreement where the
publishing company had a unilateral right to terminate the
agreement at any time by giving one month notice.18 2 The pub-
lisher made no satisfactory positive undertakings to publish the
artist's compositions. 183 In contrast to the Schroeder agree-
ment, the disputed contract in the Michael litigation was the
"renegotiation" of a contract signed in 1984.184 Because
Michael decided not to question the validity of the 1984 as a
restraint of trade, he essentially affirmed the 1988 agreement.
It was clear that Sony would have no economic interest in
preventing the publication of Michael's music. Michael had
achieved superstar status, thus, it was in Sony's best interest to
promote his music to the fullest. Applying the Nordenfelt test,
the Chancery Court correctly held that the 1988 renegotiation
signed by Michael, which was renegotiated by competent legal
counsel, was not nearly as oppressive as the terms of the
Schroeder agreement. 185 The Chancery Court stated that rene-
gotiations are common in the music business once an artist be-
comes successful, and that the agreement completed in 1988
involved concessions by both Michael and Sony.186 Under the
Nordenfelt Test, the 1988 agreement was compatible with pub-
lic interest and reasonable as between Sony and Michael.
182 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308,
1314H.
183 Id. at 1313H-14A.
184 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K.) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *16 Enggen Library, Cases File).
185 The Court in Zang Tumb Tumm Records Ltd. v. Holly Johnson, (C.A. Au-
gust, 1989) (LEXIS *14, Enggen Library, Cases File), found a contract similar to
the 1984 and 1988 agreements unenforceable as a restraint of trade. Although
the Chancery Court held as a matter of public policy Michael could not claim that
the 1988 agreement was in restraint of trade, it analyzed the provision of the
agreement under the Nordenfelt test because of the similarities between the con-
tracts in the two cases. Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.KI) Ltd.,
(Chancery Division June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *95 Enggen Library, Cases File).
186 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K.) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *99 Enggen Library, Cases File).
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C. The Effect of Exclusivity
The Schroeder court, discussing whether a contract should
be considered unfair, noted that when a person gives his exclu-
sive services to a company, that person's ability to exercise as
he or she chooses will be restricted. 187 Schroeder held that even
though the doctrine of restraint of trade is inapplicable to such
restrictions, if the contractual restrictions appear to be unnec-
essary or oppressive, "they must be justified before they can be
enforced." 88 Unlike the contract provisions in Schroeder, the
1988 agreement was not oppressive. Michael had competent
legal counsel negotiating on behalf of his interests.18 9 Addition-
ally, the 1988 agreement was the subject of a renegotiation
which improved Michael financially and set him at parity with
other world famous pop musicians. 190
Michael signed his contracts with Sony and CBS in a com-
mercial context. Under Nordenfelt reasoning, if a contract is
reasonable at the time it is entered into, the court will not "look
out for improbable and extravagant contingencies in order to
make it void."' 9 1 Similarly, an expert for Sony stated, "if a re-
cording contract is to be expected to contain anything approach-
ing absolute protection for the artist . . . the parties are in
danger of stultifying the underlying commercial purpose of the
transaction."192
It is clear that none of the 1988 agreement's restrictions go
further than what is "reasonably required to protect" 93 the in-
terests of Sony. As the Chancery Court in Petrofina (Great Brit-
187 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308,
1314G. See Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K.) Ltd., (Chancery Divi-
sion June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *106 Enggen Library, Cases File).
188 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308,
1314H.
189 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K.) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *136 Enggen Library, Cases File).
190 Id.
191 Id. at 108.
192 Id. at 109. The Chancery Court stated that "[iun a doctrine based on the
wide ground of public policy, the wider aspects of commerce must always be consid-
ered as well as the narrower aspects of the contract as between the parties." Id. at
110.
193 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308,
1310B. See Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K) Ltd., (Chancery Divi-
sion June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *115 Enggen Library, Cases File).
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ain) Ltd. v. Martin stated, "the interests of the appellants in
selling as large a quantity of their petroleum products as they
can is one which they have a right to have protected."194 Simi-
larly, Sony's interest in selling as many records as possible, the
"desire and need to be able to compete on equal terms in the
international environment against other record companies
which have long terms signing,"195 and other interests under
the Nordenfelt test are all legitimate.
Exclusive contracts such as Michael's contract with Sony
are not objectionable. As the court in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v.
Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd. 196 stated:
Sole agencies are a normal and necessary incident of commerce
and those who desire the benefits of a sole agency must deny
themselves the opportunities of other agencies. So, too, in the
case of film-star who may tie herself to a company in order to ob-
tain from them the benefits of stardom.197
Under the 1988 agreement, Michael sold his entire output
of master recordings to Sony, thereby giving up the right to sell
Master Recordings to anyone else so long as the 1988 agree-
ment remained effective. 198 Selling an entire catalogue of
Master Recordings to a record company as in the Michael case
is similar to the sole agency situation described above in Esso
and, therefore, unobjectionable.
D. The Duration of the 1988 Agreement
In Schroeder, duration was a "factor of great impor-
tance."199 Duration was also the critical factor in the English
Court of Appeal's decision in Holly Johnson.200 In Panayiotou,
the fifteen year contract limitation only operated in the event
that the minimum delivery commitment had not been complied
194 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.KI) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *115 Enggen Library, Cases File).
195 Id. at 114.
196 1968 App. Cas. 269.
197 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *115 Enggen Library, Cases File). See also Esso Petroleum
Co. Ltd. v. Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd., 1968 App. Cas. 269, 328.
198 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.KI) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *116 Enggen Library, Cases File).
199 Id.
200 Id. at 117.
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with.20 1 Michael argued that there was a lack of reciprocity, in
the sense that Sony could have terminated the 1988 agreement
by declining to exercise its next option, while Michael had no
corresponding right.20 2 As the court correctly noted, Sony
would have only terminated its contract with Michael if it was
commercially reasonable. Because of the commercial success of
Michael at the time of the 1988 signing, it would have been un-
likely that Sony would have terminated its contract with
Michael. 203 Under the 1988 agreement, Sony was interested in
commercially exploiting Michael to the fullest.20 4
E. Royalty Rates and Equitable Apportionment
The royalty rates that Michael received were not objection-
able, and were in accord with rates received by other artists in
the music business. The Chancery Court, responding to
Michael's argument that his Sony royalty rates were much less
than those he could have achieved in the open market, noted:
a comparison with open market rates presupposes that Mr.
Michael was not on the open market - i.e. that he was already
201 Id.
The Chancery Court stated:
[In the case of a new artist a record company will normally only com-
mit itself to taking one album - no doubt a prudent step, where the market
is unpredictable and the artist unproven - with options over at least five
more. At the other end of the scale, the deal available to an established
artist who is free of contract will depend on the negotiation strength of
that particular artist. Four-album deals are common for established art-
ists, but such an artist may nevertheless choose to sign up for more than
the minimum number of albums he could have achieved given his negoti-
ating strength.
Id. at 118.
202 Id. at 119.
203 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *119 Enggen Library, Cases File). Sony stated: "The dura-
tion is the function of success. If the artist is unsuccessful, it is likely that the
record company will decline to exercise an option, and the relationship will termi-
nate. It is only if an artist is actually successful that the contract will continue for
its full length." Id.
204 Id. at 123.
As Judge Parker stated:
The notion that, as matters stood on 4 January 1988, there was a real
risk that Sony Music might in effect 'put [Michael's recordings] in a
drawer and leave them there' is in my judgment far-fetched: or, to use the
language of Lord Macnaghten in Nordenfelt 'improbable and extravagant.'
Id.
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bound by the 1984 Agreement. But if he was already bound by
the 1984 Agreement, it is no surprise that in a renegotiation he
could not achieve terms as favorable as those which he could have
achieved on the open market.
20 5
In the Chancery Court's terms, "fairness" did not require
the financial return of the recording artist to represent an "eq-
uitable apportionment of the proceeds of exploitation."20 6 The
Chancery Court stated that "[i]f Mr. Michael is to be entitled to
a share of Sony's return from exploiting his services, why
should not the same apply to Sony's own employees?" 20 7 Be-
cause Michael was already bound by the 1984 agreement, it was
205 Id. at 124.
In Holly Johnson the court stated:
There was no contention for the plaintiffs at that time that the point
about the unenforceability of the agreements on grounds 'of restraint of
trade had been waived or abandoned despite what Mr. Eaton wrote. On
the contrary the picture as I see it is that there had been desultory rene-
gotiation of the terms of the two agreements from July 1985 and during
that process both sides realised that each side was reserving its position
on all points in the event that, as happened, agreement was not reached.
On the facts there was nothing at any time which could be described as an
unequivocal representation by or on behalf of the defendant that he had
decided not to proceed with his claim of unreasonable restraint of trade
.... In my judgment there is nothing in these facts to render it unjust to
the plaintiffs or unconscionable for the defendant to assert the unenforce-
ability of the two agreements on grounds of restraint of trade. Accord-
ingly in my judgment the plaintiffs fail on the question of waiver, laches
or estoppel or however else it may termed.
Zang Tumb Tumm Records Ltd. v. Holly Johnson, (C.A. August, 1989) (LEXIS *14-
15, Enggen Library, Cases File).
206 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K.) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *125 Enggen Library, Cases File).
207 Id. The Chancery Court stated that the music publishing contract in
Schroeder contained an unrestricted power for the publisher to assign. Id. at 128.
The 1988 agreement between Sony Music and Michael contains a clause stat-
ing that "such rights may be assigned by any assignee thereof. . . ." Id. This
clause, unlike the clause in Schroeder, only meant that "an assignee from Sony
Music will stand in Sony Music's shoes so far as assignment is concerned, and will
have no wider power to assign than Sony Music itself had." Id. at 129. Michael
argued against Sony Music's right of rejection, multiple sets or 'live albums,' joint
recordings, audio-visual performances, audit restrictions, alienation of copyrights,
delayed royalty accounting and artistic control, all of which Judge Parker ruled
against him. Id. at 131.
In Schroeder, Lord Reid held:
There may sometimes be room for an argument that although on a
strict literal construction restrictions could be enforced oppressively one is
entitled to have regard to the fact that a large organization could not af-
ford to act oppressively without damaging the goodwill of its business.
31
PACE INT'L L. REV.
no surprise that his royalty rates were considerably less than
those he could have received as an artist on the open market.
F. Differences between Panayiotou and Schroeder
There are substantial differences between the contractual
positions of Michael in Panayiotou and the artist in Schroeder
in relation to their publishers and record companies. The artist
in A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v Macaulay208 was
not well known and was bound to assign to the publisher "dur-
ing a long period, the fruits of his musical talent."20 9 Under the
Schroeder contract, the publisher did not have to do any-
thing.210 If the publisher used the songs which Schroeder com-
posed, the publisher had to pay Schroeder pursuant to the
terms of the contract.211 As the House of Lords in Schroeder
stated, the publisher may put the recordings "in a drawer and
leave them there."212
On the other hand, Sony would never have simply left
Michael's songs in a drawer, especially when the 1988 agree-
ment was signed at the peak of Michael's career. On the con-
trary, Sony would be interested in exploiting Michael's talents
to the fullest extent possible.
G. The Effect of Competent and Independent Legal Advice
The Chancery Court, citing two cases which dealt with the
restraint of trade issue, Binder v. Alachouzos 213 and Colchester
Borough Council v. Smith,214 correctly found that the 1988
agreement was not in restraint of trade. In Binder, the compro-
mise agreement between the two contesting parties was the re-
But the power to assign leaves no room for that argument. We cannot
assume that an assignee would always act reasonably.
A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308, 13 1OB-
C.
208 [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308.
209 Id. at 1313D.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 [1972] 2 Q.B. 151 (C.A.).
214 [1992] Ch. 421 (C.A.).
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sult of a bargain involving solicitors and counsel on both
sides.215
Similarly, the parties in Colchester entered into a bona fide
compromise, which the contesting party had signed with the ad-
vice of a solicitor. 216 Like the parties in Binder and Colchester,
the compromise of the Inner Vision Action in the Michael case
resulted from bona fide negotiations. Both Michael's attorneys
and CBS's attorneys pursued their respective positions "with
vigor, if not rancor."21 7 As such, it is clear that the 1988 agree-
ment, which was negotiated by competent legal counsel, did not
offend public policy.
Additionally, Panayiotou can be distinguished from Clifford
Davis Management Ltd. v. WEA Records Ltd.,218 based on the
existence of competent and independent legal representation.
In Clifford Davis, there was an inequality of bargaining power
since the plaintiff was the manager of the group.21 9 The com-
poser received no legal advice before signing the agreements,
and the terms of the assignment were unfair.220 Unlike Clifford
Davis, Michael had independent legal advice well versed in the
workings of the music industry when he negotiated the 1984
agreement and the 1988 renegotiation. In addition, the terms
of Michael's agreement were not unfair as those in Clifford Da-
vis. Unlike the contract in Clifford, the disputed 1988 agree-
ment was signed at the height of Michael's popularity.
Therefore, it would be unlikely for Sony not to publish Michael's
recordings.
H. The article 85 Claim
The Chancery Court was also correct in holding that "the
market for the services of U.K. recording artists in the pop field
is a purely national and domestic market."221 Jurisdictionally,
215 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *96 Enggen Library, Cases File).
216 Id. at 97.
217 Id. at 98.
218 [19751 1 W.L.R. 61 (C.A.).
219 Id. at 62H.
220 Id. at 65G.
221 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *171 Enggen Library, Cases File). Michael's counsel said:
"there is no evidence that U.K. artists sign with foreign record companies (except
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article 85 was inapplicable to Michael. For purposes of article
85(1), there was "no Community-wide market for the services of
U.K. recording artists in the field of popular music." 222 At trial
no evidence was presented to support the premise that English
artists sign with foreign record companies. 223 As such, "the
1988 agreement does not affect trade between Member States
at the 'raw material' end of the chain of supply, that is to say in
the market for Mr. Michael's recording services."224
Pursuant to his contract, Michael's entire output of master
recordings during the 1988 agreement, could have lasted as
long as 15 years. This provision, in and of itself, was not suffi-
cient to demonstrate an affect on trade between Member States
under article 85.225 Since Michael treated the 1984 agreement
as an enforceable agreement under English law, and one which
did not contravene article 85(1), the 1988 agreement did not
have an effect on competition in the relevant market.226 Based
on the evidence presented by Michael, he did not meet the juris-
dictional requirements of article 85.227
for Rolling Stones and Rob Halford with Sony US, and the Stone Roses with Gef-
fen)." Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id. The burden was on Michael to establish that it was "possible to foresee
with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law
or fact that the 1988 agreement may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or
potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States." Id. This test was for-
mulated in Societe Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966 E.C.R.
235.
226 Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K) Ltd., (Chancery Division
June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *174 Enggen Library, Cases File).
227 If an artist or record company were found to be "undertakings" for purposes
of article 85, a court would then have to analyze whether the agreement made
between the artist and the record company has an impact on trade between Mem-
ber States or whether such an agreement distorts competition. EEC TREATY, art.
85, sec. 1. For this purpose, the agreement must be evaluated with respect to the
economic and legal context in which the agreement was made. Brasserie de
Haecht v. Vilkins, 1967 E.C.R. 407.
Courts, therefore, consider the changing consumer preferences with regard to
music purchases and record company strategies in ensuring profitability under
such conditions. Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K) Ltd., (Chancery
Division June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *120 Enggen Library, Cases File). As such, exclu-
sivity is a necessary component to artist agreements in the music industry because
record companies can only recoup their investment in the artist if the companies
bind their artists once they becomes successful. The profits the record company
receives from the successful artist can then be used to offset the losses incurred by
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I. Impact of the George Michael Decision
Although Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v. Macau-
lay228 was an English case, with no precedential value on other
countries, it nevertheless stunned the music industry and
caused record companies to analyze their business practices
more closely for restraint of trade issues.229 As a result of this
holding, record companies were more inclined to seek legal ad-
vice with regard to the contracts they sign with their artists.23 0
Like Schroeder Music Publishing, the Panayiotou decision in its
own right will have an international impact on artists as well as
record companies. Michael is the first pop recording artist to
use article 85 of the Treaty of Rome to rescind a recording con-
tract. A likely consequence of the Michael action will be that
other artists, with more exigent circumstances, will follow
Michael's lead in the use of article 85 as a viable method for
rescinding their recording contracts.23 '
Established artists, however, will not be able to rescind
their recording contracts unless they can prove the elements of
restraint of trade and not mere "dissatisfaction" with their re-
cording agreements. In Panayiotou, the court distinguished an
artist dissatisfied with the marketing methods of his or her re-
cording company from one who is exploited. Based on the facts
before it, the Chancery Court found that Michael was simply
dissatisfied.232
In terms of European Community impact, although artists
might have a new weapon for rescinding contracts in article 85,
the record company in the marketing and distribution of less successful artists.
Such exclusivity is critical to companies competing in a market characterized by
an ephemeral quality in consumer taste. Id.
As a result, the context in which such an agreement is signed weighs in favor
of the recording company that signs an artist to a contract for a number of years.
228 [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308.
229 Jane Tatt, Music Publishing and Recording Contracts in Perspective, 5 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REP. 132 (1987).
230 Id.
231 The dismissal of Michael's article 85 claim might have been different had
Michael pleaded that the 1984 agreement was also in violation of competition rules
and provided the court with more substantial evidence with regards to the exclu-
sivity of the 1988 agreement. See generally Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertain-
ment (U.K) Ltd., (Chancery Division June 21, 1994) (LEXIS *173 Enggen Library,
Cases File).
232 Id. at 155.
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they will not be able to overturn agreements on the grounds of
restraint of trade, unless the agreement is intrinsically un-
fair.23 3 Additionally, the artist's counsel must note the jurisdic-
tional hurdles imposed by English courts in terms of proving a
recording agreement's affect on trade within the European
Community.234
The most important effect of the Panayiotou decision will be
to truncate the contract periods artists sign with record compa-
nies to avoid litigation.235 Gone are the days of fifteen year con-
tracts that require the production of eight albums. As such,
contracts must be shortened in order for companies to avoid re-
straint of trade claims and costly litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on English case law, European Community case law
and treaty law, the Chancery Court in Panayiotou was correct
in holding that the contract between Michael and Sony was
neither in restraint of trade, nor in violation of article 85 of the
Treaty of Rome. In the commercial context of the recording in-
dustry, the contract Michael signed with Sony was clearly not
unconscionable. Michael had industry attorneys representing
his interests through each successive contract negotiation. Ad-
ditionally, there was no Community-wide market for Michael's
services as a recording artist and consequently, his 1988 agree-
233 Such unfairness was clearly delineated in Clifford, O'Sullivan, and Schroe-
der where English courts found it unreasonable to tie artists to companies that had
no intention of promoting their artist's work. In each of these cases artists signed
contracts with record companies at the beginning of their careers, unlike Michael.
See generally O'Sullivan v. Management Agency and Music Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R.
448; Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. W.E.A. Records Ltd., [1975] 1 W.L.R. 61
(C.A.); A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308.
234 O'Sullivan v. Management Agency and Music Ltd, [1984] 3 W.L.R. 448;
Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. W.E.A. Records Ltd., [1975] 1 W.L.R. 61 (C.A.);
A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co., Ltd v. Macaulay [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308.
235 Clearly, Michael's settlement with Sony in July of 1995 will have an effect
on the contracts other internationally successful pop musicians enter into with
their record companies. The Virgin-Dreamworks contract, with a two album com-
mitment and a royalty rate conservatively estimated at over 20%, was essentially
the contractual terms Michael hoped to negotiate with Sony Music before he filed
suit against the company. Although Michael lost his suit against Sony Music, he
did shift the leverage between artists of his stature and their record companies.
Adam White and Dominic Pride, George Michael Arrives at Dreamworks / Virgin
Sony Suit Settled, BILLBOARD, July 22, 1995.
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ment could not affect trade between Member States. Although
Michael lost his case against Sony, record companies have been
put on notice and will certainly have to think twice before sign-
ing an artist to a long term contract similar to the one litigated
in Panayiotou.
Karl Zucconi
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